The price of security is the reciprocal of the interest rate

This blog didn't last long after I started it a year ago, but new years renew old resolutions, so here's another post. Russ Roberts and James Hamilton discuss mounting Federal government debt on EconTalk and touch briefly on the subject of this blog here. As always, EconTalk is well worth a listen.

The early discussion of state debt and unprecedented deficits presumes that "the market" now satisfies the Federal government's appetite for "credit". Does it? Who bought the four week notes discussed, outside of the Federal Reserve system itself and other central banks/sovereign authorities? I don't buy four week notes. You could say that I buy them indirectly when I deposit cash in my FDIC insured savings account. If that's "the market", shouldn't we throw up our hands and become socialists?

At one point, Hamilton basically asks, "If you can't trust the government, who can you trust?" He seems to argue that "sovereign debt" (marketable entitlement to tax revenue) must be beyond reproach; otherwise, all other financial obligations are suspect. If creditors can't trust the state ruling me, then they can't trust me either, so I inherit the state's bad credit rating somehow.

I don't inherit my dad's credit rating or my kid's credit rating or my neighbor's credit rating or even my employer's credit rating in quite the same way, but creditors will be less willing to lend to me if they can't expect the state to repay its bonds by taxing me. I don't understand this logic. I must be confused by some Ron Paulian mythology.

Russ and Hamilton agree that the looming demographic crisis is not directly relevant to the current financial crisis. I disagree for several reasons.

Who bought and sold the mortgage backed securities that the Fed recently monetized well above market valuations? One answer must be "would be retirees". We're in the last chance decade, the decade immediately preceding the first of wave of baby boom retirees. The "boom" is two decades long. The first half of it is now between 55 and 65. Most of these people haven't retired, but they're thinking very hard about retirement. They're doing what financial advisors tell people in their late fifties and early sixties to do. They're swapping equity for debt, growth for income, risk for security.

So these people, or their agents in pension funds and other institutions, bought many securities that turned out not to be so secure. The Fed then bought the securities from them for more than their market value, and with the proceeds of these sales, the would be retirees are buying Treasury securities in a "flight to safety". Maybe they're buying short term CDs in "the market", but that's practically the same thing.

What would be happening without this massive conversion of "market investments" to entitlement to tax revenue? The "investors" would lose entitlement to future consumption as the economic organizations on which they bet dissolve and the productive means reorganize otherwise. By replacing this lost entitlement with entitlement to tax revenue, states ensure that would be retirees do not themselves reorganize resources for more productive use. They don't labor longer themselves. They don't leverage their assets and thus risk further losses. They trust the government to raise taxes for them, because ... who else can you trust?

If everyone at once stops eating beef and starts eating chicken, does the supply of chicken immediately adjust to meet the demand or does the price of chicken rise? Do we really replace beef consumption with chicken consumption, or do we only eat less meat?

The price of security is the reciprocal of the interest rate. The price of security is now rising, because supply can't keep up with demand. States and statutory monetary authorities have a lot to do with precisely how this adjustment plays out, but it's playing out, and it's playing out now. No one can predict the future well enough to make credible promises to burgeoning purchasers of security, except possibly the statesmen who may simply seize produce to keep their promises.

Russ and Hamilton also agree that promises to Social Security beneficiaries are less sacrosanct than promises to Federal creditors. We'll see about that as inflation continues to swallow the value of Treasury notes yielding less than a percent while SS benefits continue to grow with inflation or faster. I expect Medicare to deliver fewer benefits to future retirees than it delivers currently, and statesmen will adjust other benefits as well, but the pressure to inflate away the value of Treasury notes instead is immense, and the statesmen don't require any cooperation from the market to do it. They need the cooperation of the Fed, but the Fed ain't the market.

Peak Rent vs. Peak Growth

In a discussion of Social Security reform at Reason.com, MikeP asks, "Doesn't the massive increase in per capita GDP over the last 200 years blow your Peak Rent argument out of the water?" I'll expand here on my reply there.

Peak Rent is not a peak in output. It's the peaking of real entitlements to consume that people seeking rents can acquire. I'm not suggesting a peak in the total volume of rents either, only a peak in the rent that rent-seekers effectively can collect, per rent-seeker.

In a later post, I'll address more precisely my usage of "rent-seeker". Social Security beneficiaries are the quintessential example but certainly not the only example or even the most significant.

That workers are more productive doesn't make it easier for baby boomers to retire for the duration they expect with the consumption they expect, because baby boomers themselves are the more productive workers. Their own declining production as they retire is a big part the problem. I therefore expect them to retire less than they expect, to work longer, to earn more of the yield of their own labor and less of the rent they now hope to collect from others.

The figure at the top of this blog (currently) depicts the growth of the S&P 500 over the last few decades. The figure is a taken from a screenshot of a similar chart that readers may generate at money.cnn.com. The meteoric growth of this statistic in the eighties and nineties seems likely to subside in coming decades, but another figure better indicates the "peak" in Peak Rent.




This figure depicts the now declining payroll tax revenue added each year to the Social Security Trust Fund, the difference between Social Security taxes paid and Social Security benefits paid. This figure shows the expected surplus from 2009 forward. This surplus peaked this year, in 2008.

The thesis of this blog is simple. Similar peaks occur in many other financial balances around this time. While many analysts acknowledge the role of demographics in the peak of the payroll tax surplus, we hardly discuss the role of population aging in the S&P 500 peak, the housing market peak and other peaks.

MikeP continues, "Besides, in case you haven't noticed, developed aging countries are only now reaching huge pools of new labor in developing nations. Let's talk again in 50 years when every country in the world is where China will be 20 years from now."

I have noticed, but population aging is more widespread than we commonly realize.




This figure, like the figure in the blog's opening post below, illustrates aging of the populations of various nations, including the People's Republic of China. In China, statutory restraints on population growth, the One Child policy, have accelerated population aging. Over the next two decades, the number of workers per retiree (as defined below) in China falls from around eight to around four.

China's working aged population is currently much larger, compared with the population of older persons, but growth of the working population slows rapidly, and per capita GDP in China is now only fifteen percent of per capita GDP in the United States. Supporting China's rapidly aging population in coming decades thus will be very challenging.

The Chinese people, not surprisingly, seek rents keenly in the United States for this reason. We in the U.S. don't invest in China as much as the Chinese invest in us. Even if Chinese output continues expanding despite population aging, future Chinese productivity is not ours to claim. Rather, our productivity is theirs to claim.

So what can we expect in fifty years? I don't pretend to know, but credible demographers predict a peak in the human population worldwide by the middle of the twentieth century. Others predict a peak a bit later.

Conventional wisdom for decades celebrated lower birth rates and increased life expectancy, while we enjoyed the benefits of supporting fewer children, of eating our seed corn rather than planting it, but an aging population and ultimately a peak in population poses great challenges, even greater than a global peak in conventional oil production. Are we confronting these challenges or denying them?

Inflation, Deflation and Recession

Discussing recent talk of deflation with a friend, I offered these thoughts. He asked, "My understanding is that the Fed controls the money supply, which is what inflation really measures, and that they maintain a low but steady level of inflation. How could it be that we could end up with deflation?"

Ironically, the people worried about deflation now are the ones disputing the "slow but steady level of inflation" in recent years, because they define "inflation" in terms of the money supply (or the volume of credit extended) rather than a current rise in consumer prices.

The recent rise in house prices wasn't slow. Share prices also rose rapidly in recent decades. Share prices fell after 9/11 but recovered rapidly in a very low interest rate environment. Consumer prices and wages haven't risen extremely rapidly yet, but the CPI has been over 5% recently, and that level seems worrisome.

I understand the inflation/deflation issue this way, from the Austrian perspective. Malinvestment occurs when credit is very easy, because easy credit enables people to reorganize means of production. You're a builder. I borrow to buy a building from you. The building will house a widget factory. I hope to earn enough producing and selling the widgets to repay the loan. The lower the interest rate, the more I'll pay for the building (and other resources). That's part of the inflation issue.

A lower interest rate also lowers my risk aversion, because my expected yield on the widget factory involves uncertain assumptions, like how many widgets I can turn out and what price they will fetch. My expected price is a product of prices I predict and the likelihood that my predictions are correct. A lower cost of producing the widgets tempts me to accept a lower likelihood of earning a given price for a particular volume of my produce.

In the Austrian view, when credit is too easy, we invest too much, i.e. we shift too much expenditure away from current consumption and toward organizing means for future consumption. Eventually, consumers effectively can't absorb all of the produce, so prices fall, businesses fail to profit, and we have a recession. The price of productive means previously inflated by the cheap credit then also falls as investors divest. The longer investors use cheap credit to organize means to satisfy demand also created by cheap consumer credit, the deeper we sink into unsustainable debt, and the longer the deflationary recession lasts.

This Austrian view involves an imbalance between production for current consumption and production for future consumption, an imbalance between the production of final goods and the production of intermediate goods that are means of producing other goods; however, predicting a fall in the price of common goods involves a questionable assumption.

Entrepreneurship is experimental. An entrepreneurial investment is an experiment in the organization of productive means to produce something that consumers might or might not want. Producing too much of a desirable good is only one reason that ventures fail to profit. Entrepreneurs may produce goods that no one ever much wanted. When we have "the right amount of credit", new experiments replace these failed experiments continuously, and the supply of desirable goods grows just fast enough to meet growing demand, so prices are stable.

When excessive credit simulates excessive experimental entrepreneurship, malinvestment occurs, but the supply of goods that people actually want need not increase. The supply of desired goods can even decrease as resources producing desirable goods are drawn into entrepreneurial experiments destined to fail. In this scenario, consumer prices rise until investors acknowledge the failures and reorganize resources to produce more desirable goods. This recession can be inflationary rather then deflationary.

Some Austrians argue that malinvestment is simply a matter of central bankers commanding the extension of too much credit, but I take a different view. Excessive credit can occur without central authorities. For example, baby boomers want to retire for a given period, so they save a lot, i.e. they defer current consumption to purchase means of future production. This expansion of credit is not a matter of central authorities simply printing money. It reflects real desires by current consumers to defer current consumption for future consumption.

But simply deferring consumption to purchase means of production or extend credit does not guarantee future production. We must purchase sufficient means of the right sort to satisfy the future demands. Investors don't really behave this way. Investors purchase means to satisfy current demands, not future demands. Even if savers really defer consumption to invest in future production, they can, over a long period of time, fail to purchase enough of the real means of producing in the future to replace the consumption they currently defer.

The most significant example of this malinvestment in recent decades is inadequate investment in labor, i.e. we probably didn't produce enough labor (children) to produce the goods that retirees expect to consume in the future. Even if these retirees defer as much current consumption, purchasing capital instead, as they expect to consume in retirement, they don't necessarily purchase enough of the required capital.

For example, would be retirees can build factories that later do not produce the expected goods for want of adequate labor, because the would be retirees produce the factories but not the labor. Simply "saving" is not enough. We must invest in the right mix of capital, and I doubt that we have. Our housing crisis may be an example of building too many "factories" for too few laborers.

So I don't expect a deflationary recession, except in particular goods like housing and "intermediate goods", goods enabling laborers to produce other goods. I expect an inflationary recession, or I expect stagflation with output growing more slowly as many prices rise, simply because the labor force grows more slowly while many consumers try to retire.

Between 1970 and 2000, the U.S. labor force (people between 20 and 64) grew three times faster than it will grow between 2000 and 2030, but the number of U.S. retirees (people 65 and over) will double over the later period, growing even faster than it grew in the earlier period.

U.S. population (thousands)
	1970	2000	2030
Children (0-19)	77,170	83,236	95,104
Workers (20-64)	106,706	166,515	197,027
Retirees (65+)	20,106	35,061	71,453
Retirees/worker	19%	21%	36%
Children/worker	72%	50%	48%

Change in U.S. population
	1970-2000	2000-2030
Children (0-19)	+8%	+14%
Workers (20-64)	+56%	+18%
Retirees (65+)	+74%	+104%
Retirees/worker	+12%	+71%
Children/worker	-31%	-3.4%

The figures are from the U.S. Census Bureau. Projected figures for 2000-2030 are reasonably reliable for Workers and Retirees, since the projection largely ages people already born using existing actuarial statistics. A projection of U.S. population must assume considerable immigration. The projected number of children assumes a substantial increase in fertility, but this increase cannot affect the projected Retirees/Worker ratio.

Peak Oil

I suggest in the Welcome below that Peak Rent is like Peak Oil. So what is Peak Oil, and how is it like Peak Rent? Wikipedia describes the idea this way.

In the 1950s, the geologist Marion King Hubbert observed that explorers for oil discovered new reserves in the continental United States less rapidly than Americans consumed existing reserves. He concluded that U.S. production would eventually peak and then decline.

Based on his theoretical modeling of oil discovery and production, Hubbert predicted a peak around 1965. Though he considered a peak in 1965 most likely, his prediction encompassed a range including 1970, so Hubbert's reputation was established when production in the continental U.S. peaked in that year.

Hubbert's theory of a peak in conventional oil production is not based simply upon a presumably finite supply of oil. The amount of oil under the ground is a factor, but so is the difficulty and the cost of discovering ever smaller oil fields as the larger, more easily discovered fields are exhausted.

Small fields, containing even more oil than we've consumed thus far, possibly remain in the continental U.S., but no one knows where they are. The likelihood of finding a small well on a particular square mile is remote, and the cost of searching this area for a well is considerable.

If the product of the likelihood of discovery and the cost of searching an area exceeds the expected return from small wells, oil from these wells, however vast its total supply, will not be produced. Seek and ye shall find ... but not at a profit.

Even now that oil production in the continental U.S is greatly reduced, discovery of a large, new conventional oil reserve is possible. At this point, the discovery would be a Black Swan (see below), but it's conceivable. You might discover this well in your back yard fortuitously tomorrow; however, what we know of the likelihood of discovering the well does not justify the cost of searching for it.

If you happened to discover this Black Swan on your land, the rent you might charge for use of the land would skyrocket; however, searching for this Swan now seems like dropping a quarter in a slot machine. You might win, but if you keep dropping quarters long enough, you'll be a net loser, because this outcome is built into the machine.

In this sense, Peak Oil is a special case of Peak Rent. An oil well is only one of the scarce resources we'd like to own to earn its rents. Earning this rent is difficult, because discovering its source is both unlikely and costly.

I also suggest in the Welcome that Peak Rent is even more inevitable than Peak Oil. Oil is a very valuable resource, but it is not the most valuable resource. Classical liberals from Mises to Simon tell us that human labor, including innovative, intellectual labor, is the most valuable resource. This assertion is not simple politics stroking the human ego. It is sound economic science.

A Black Swan contradicting Peak Oil seems unlikely, but it could be out there. The coming labor shortage is a matter of demographics. We can't go back in time and have more children.

A child could discover an oil substitute or some other innovative resource of unimaginable value, but even if this Black Swan exists, finding it and becoming entitled to its rents is increasingly unlikely, while rents paid by more common humanity decline, relative to demand for them, simply because common humanity declines relatively.

Fat Tailed Distributions,The Law of Large Numbers andBlack Swans

If you hated math class, this post might not be your cup of tea, but give it a chance and ask questions.

The previous post introduced mathematical concepts unfamiliar to most people, even to most economists and certainly to most politicians. I'll try to explain them here. In the preceding post, I try to explain how they relate to Peak Rent.

I'll illustrate "fat tailed distribution" with a concrete example. Below are two, relatively simple, discrete frequency distributions, one thin tailed and one fat tailed.

Thin tailed distribution
Value:	1	2	3	4	5	....	N
Frequency:	1/2	1/4	1/8	1/16	1/32	....	1/2^N
(one over two to the power of N)

Fat tailed distribution
Value:	1	2	3	4	5	....	N
Frequency:	1/2	1/6	1/12	1/20	1/30	....	1/N*(N + 1)
(one over N times (N + 1))

You can verify by googling (or mathematically) that

1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + 1/32 + 1/64 + ... = 1

and

1/2 + 1/6 + 1/12 + 1/20 + 1/30 + 1/42 + ... = 1,

so both frequency distributions are properly normalized. In other words, I can approximate two populations with these distributions by filling two boxes with tokens, labeled 1, 2, 3 and so on, as follows.

Each box contains roughly a million tokens. In the first box, half a million tokens are labeled 1, a quarter million are labeled 2, an eighth of a million are labeled 3 and so on. In the second box, half a million tokens are labeled 1, a sixth of a million are labeled 2, a twelfth of a million are labeled 3 and so on. I add tokens to each box this way until both boxes contain 999,000 tokens.

I truncate the distributions at 999,000 tokens/box, because I otherwise require fractional tokens. For example, if the total number of tokens is a million, the number of tokens labeled 20 in the first distribution is less than one, because 2 to the 20th power is greater than a million.

If you randomly draw a hundred tokens from the first box and average the numbers labeling them, the average will be very nearly two. If you draw a thousand tokens and average the numbers, the average will almost surely be closer to two. This convergence on two is what Russ meant by "Law of Large Numbers" in the previous post, but mathematicians conventionally use "Law of Large Numbers" differently.

If you randomly draw a hundred tokens from the second box and average the numbers on them, the average will be around 6.5 but maybe not so close to 6.5. If you draw a thousand tokens and average the numbers, the larger sample average is no more predictable than the smaller sample average. In other words, large sample averages have no expected value.

From both boxes, the proportion of tokens labeled 1 approaches 1/2 in samples of increasing size. This convergence is the Law of Large Numbers.

Because we've truncated the distribution, very large sample averages from the second box (approaching a million in size) do approach 6.5, because the entire truncated distribution has this mean value; however, the untruncated distribution has no mean value.

If we fill a box with roughly a billion tokens and stop when we can no longer add whole tokens, the mean value of the entire box is larger than 6.5. If we use a trillion tokens, the mean value is larger still. If we keep filling larger and larger boxes this way, the mean value increases without limit.

Why do large sample averages from the second box have no expected value (if the samples are much smaller than a million)? Consider how I've filled the boxes. Both boxes have a million tokens, but as I add tokens of increasing value, I fill the first box faster.

For example, I add a quarter million tokens labeled 2 to the first box but only a sixth of a million of these tokens to the second box. As a consequence, the highest label in the second box is much larger than the highest label in the first box.

In fact, the highest label in the first box is only 10, while the highest label in the second box is over 1000, a hundred times larger, and roughly 9000 tokens in the second box are higher than 100.

When you sample from the second box, you occasionally pick one of these rare tokens with a very large label, and these very large values contribute far more to the sample average than other values in the sample. Sample averages from the second box are less predictable for this reason.

The rare but significant tokens are Taleb's Black Swans. See the previous post.

In economic terms, if the tokens represent the wealth of persons, the richest person recorded in the second box is much richer than the richest person in the first box. In reality, wealth is distributed more like tokens in the second box.

Kling on Freddie and Fannie

My interest in Peak Rent is decades old, but this blog is the offspring of my more recent love affair with the blog Cafe Hayek and the podcast EconTalk. I enthusiastically recommend both. A central thesis of this blog is bolded below.

This post replies to now obsessive talk of the credit crunch following the deflation of the housing bubble and the mortgage backed securities that propelled it, but this blog places these events in a broader context.

This episode of EconTalk features Arnold Kling, a former economist at the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Freddie Mac, one of the main characters in the Mortgage Backed Securities story.

Kling says, "The mortgages can default, but the bonds cannot, so we (Freddie Mac) are in the middle taking the default risk."

He doesn't continue, "... until we can't bear the risk anymore, whereupon we transfer the risk to taxpayers."

Freddie Mac sells rents to rent seekers. Seeking rents was always its business, even before the subprime debacle. If it doesn't sell rents to rent seekers, it needn't sell bonds at all.

With Congressional authority, GSEs could simply create money to lend and then remove this money from circulation as it's repaid, or (equivalently) Congress could endow FNMA with funds, and FNMA could lend these funds and then relend them as loans are repaid, charging enough interest to keep its funds stable or growing rapidly enough to meet a growing demand for credit. It's only function then would be to police the credit. It would never pass yields to anyone except the growing pool of home sellers.

If the buyers of bonds don't stand to lose when credit is poorly policed, then they play no role in the policing of credit, so they're pure rent seekers; therefore, selling rents to rent seekers is the primary motive of Freddie Mac's business definitively. That's not a theory. It's an observation.

Referring to mortgage backed securities, Russ says, "The law of large numbers is such that it's going to be more predictable ..."

The law of large numbers need not apply in this context at all and presumably does not apply. This point is crucial.

First, "Law of Large Numbers" technically doesn't refer to a statistical average (like the yield of a package of many mortgages); however, this usage apparently is common. Here is Wikipedia's page on the subject.

Techinically, Wikipedia doesn't describe the Law of Large Numbers at all. The page describes a result involving a statistical average when a distribution has a well defined mean. This result is a consequence of the Law of Large Numbers, but it's not the Law of Large Numbers. At least, it's not what I learned to call "the Law of Large Numbers" in graduate school. The Law of Large Numbers does not involve a statistical average or assume a distribution with a well defined mean.

The Law of Large Numbers says that the proportion of outcomes, in random samples, with a particular characteristic approaches the probability (or frequency) of this characteristic, so for example, the proportion of heads approaches one half in a sequence of fair coin tosses. You can verify this usage of "Law of Large Numbers" by googling. Here's a page at Berkeley for example.

This Law of Large Numbers (not the result described at Wikipedia) is always true for any probability distribution, because it's essentially tautological. It's true because of what we mean by "probability" and "random sample". As such, it's more of like a "law", i.e. it's true without exception.

The result described at Wikipedia is what Russ means by "Law of Large Numbers", but this result involves an assumption about the distribution of values, so it's not true in general. The Wikipedia article states this assumption when it says, "Given a random variable with a finite expected value ..."

"Expected value" is a property of a statistical distribution, but some distributions don't have a well defined (finite) expected value. A "fat tailed distribution" doesn't have a finite expected value, by definition.

In a fat tailed distribution, rare values contribute significantly to statistical samples, so that larger and larger sample averages don't converge to a well defined mean value. The standard example is Cauchy's distribution.

We typically study thin tailed distributions in elementary statistics, the standard example being the Gaussian (or Normal) distribution, but fat tailed distributions may be the rule rather than the exception in Economics. See the EconTalk with Nicholas Taleb.

The yield of a mortgage backed security essentially is an average of the yields of mortgages backing the security. If the distribution of the underlying yields is fat tailed, the yield of the security need not be more predictable than the yield of a single mortgage.

So why might the underlying distribution be fat tailed? Can we simply blame politicians encouraging subprime mortgages? I don't think so. The problems we're seeing with mortgage backed securities are not limited to these political influences or to these securities.

Similar problems exist with all CDOs and also with mutual funds and even with corporations, since the yield of a corporation essentially is an average of yields of its factors of production.

The underlying distribution of yields is fat tailed, because Black Swans are everywhere. A particular political influence is only one example. We can't point to one Black Swan and say that we've explained the problem. The next Black Swan could be red.

Kling said, "The creativity of mortgage bankers in delivering fraudulent loans is tremendous ..."

Basically, Kling indicts the "unregulated market" here, but it's a mistake simply to blame criminal "fraud" for the fat tail. This fraud is just another Black Swan. We can't kill all the Black Swans by passing a law. Killing them all is not possible, even in principle, just as a centrally planned economy without market prices can't be more productive than a free market economy in principle.

Kling said, "I'm not sure what made investors willing to buy these securities ..."

Kling asks the right question. It's not about the sellers. It's about the buyers. We have too many buyers. When so many people demand rents, riskier credit is an inevitable outcome, because all the rent seekers exhaust the less risky rents. No political influence is required.

Fundamentally, we're exploring a fat tailed distribution of yields including many negative yields. State regulators can't make the distribution thin tailed without simply commanding unproductive rents. If they could, we'd all be socialists by now, even more than we are.

So what if politicians persuade their cronies in a GSE to package many risky mortgages into still risky "securities"? If less risky securities exist with acceptable yields, who buys the GSE's paper?

We (our pension funds and other institutions) bought the GSE's paper, because we couldn't buy enough rent elsewhere. Just look at the yield on ten year Treasuries. Can you retire on three and a half percent, with inflation at five percent?

Kling said, "Why not subsidize the downpayment?"

Kling hasn't heard of the $7500 tax credit for "first time home buyers" enacted earlier this year. "First time" means that you haven't owned a house in three years.

http://www.federalhousingtaxcredit.com/

Of course, this credit is a pass-thru benefit for rent seekers and has little to do with helping home buyers.

Welcome

Welcome to Peak Rent, the blog and the historically unprecedented event. Mortgage Backed Securities, The Credit Crisis and The Bailout are the Top Story Tonight, but these events only preview a much longer show now opening. The peak in the payroll tax surplus, reportedly this year, is possibly more significant, but we aren't discussing it with the same vigor or much relating it to the Story of the Day. We'll discuss it here, even if most people pay little attention to us.

RDavis provides the following chart to motivate our discussion. I repost it here linked to his site and hope he doesn't mind, since I have no clue who he is. I've researched the same figures, and they've been widely discussed, so you can believe the chart, and even if you don't, the wonders of the internet enable you to verify them yourself.




Why Peak Rent?

It's like Peak Oil, only even more inevitable.

Wikipedia defines "rent seeking" well enough. We'll use the term a lot here. I associate the term with Smith, Ricardo and classically liberal economics, but let's not crowd the boat too much. We're all in it. My libertarian bias will be plain enough, but this blog invites a broad, civil discussion of the issue.

Demography is destiny. The ratio of retirees (persons over 64) to workers (persons between 20 and 64) in the United States will nearly double over the next two decades. The number of workers per retiree will fall to the unprecedented level of roughly 2.5 by 2030, but we'll feel the effects much sooner. The thesis of this blog is that we're feeling them now, but the curtain is only now rising. The show has hardly begun.

Let's talk about it.